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Abstract: This article discusses homeland security breaches involving the United States General 
Accounting Office’s Office of Special Investigations. 
 
Yet another in a long line of revelations about homeland security breaches involves the United States 
General Accounting Office's Office of Special Investigations (OSI). Undercover investigators for the OSI 
were able to violate the security of four federal government buildings through the use of forged identity 
badges and persuasive verbal and nonverbal presentations. The investigators were able to obtain after-
hours access codes and were allowed to roam through the buildings and introduce objects that could 
have been or have masked weapons or explosives. But before jumping on the bandwagon of being 
shocked at such egregious security incompetence, one might pause to consider the phenomenology of 
security personnel. 
 
It might well be that the undercover investigators were posing as individuals less likely to pose a security 
threat based on the assumed social attributions and spontaneous profiling of the security personnel. 
That is, the undercover investigators intentionally may not have "looked like" significant security 
threats, and, therefore, the security personnel let them pass through security. As a matter of fact, the 
undercover investigators "looked like" security personnel, and, therefore, the actual security personnel 
let them pass around security as well. In fact, the undercover investigators were actual security 
personnel with no malicious intent against federal buildings, and, therefore, the non-undercover 
security personnel were making security-correct decisions. 
 
One might argue that the non-undercover security personnel's job was not to make security-correct 
decisions but to practice "good security" through complying with security procedures possibly lacking 
high validity associated with security-correct decisions. Herein, we see some of the absurdities of 
traditional security psychology. Rigid adherence to a formal, standard procedure may be far divorced 
from the intent of the procedure in so far as that intent is to engender security-correct decisions--as 
opposed to gainful employment for a security industry or to reassurance of the general public. Would 
the non-undercover security personnel have been commended for letting terrorist-looking individuals 
(according to the personnel's own attributions and spontaneous profiling) pass through and around 
security if the right badges and other security paraphernalia and behaviors had been manifested? If the 
answer to the latter question is in the affirmative, terrorist or other security threats would only have to 
successfully emulate official images of individuals who are not security threats--an emulation facilitated 
by requiring rigid adherence of security personnel to a formal, standard operating procedure. Successful 
emulation would ensure successful security tragedy. 
 
So should the security personnel be punished for making the correct "real" security decision? Should 
such punishment serve the foundation of homeland security and defense? 
 
This brief analysis of a common public event is not intended to belittle security program research, 
development, implementation, and evaluation, but only to demonstrate the complexity and challenge of 
one of history's oldest professions. (See Firestone, D. May 1, 2002). Federal team breaches security in 4 
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buildings. The New York Times, p. A16; Garwood, A. (1999). Psychic security: Its origins, development 
and disruption. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 15, 358-367; Gordon, C., & Arian, A. (2001). Threat and 
decision making. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45, 196-215; Harden, J. (2000). There's no place like 
home: The public/private distinction in children's theorizing of risk and safety. Childhood: A Global 
Journal of Child Research, 7, 43-59.) (Keywords: Homeland Security, Security Personnel, Security 
Studies.) 
 
 
 
2
International Bulletin of Political Psychology, Vol. 12, Iss. 16 [2002], Art. 1
https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol12/iss16/1
